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1 Additional Spatial Components
In our main estimations, the spatial components consist of the distance to the five permanent
UNSC members and continental dummies. However, it may well be possible that other spatial
aspects of the conflict nation play a role in determining UNSC intervention decisions. To test
for any further spatial characteristics that might be present in the data, we first create a spatial
cross-section in which each observation unit is a country. There is therefore one observation
for every country that had at least one conflict since 1950 (variable Intervspatial in the online
appendix). Consequently, we also collapse the explanatory variables. As for the intensity of the
conflict, we code this variable as equal to one if the country experienced at least one year with
more than 999 deaths in any of its conflicts (Maximum intense). Regarding the conflict form,
we count the number of internal and interstate conflicts (# of internal and # of interstate)
and include both of these variables in the regressions. As for population size, GDP per capita,
and trade openness, we calculate the average of these values for every conflict country at the
beginning of their conflicts (Population average, GDP/capita average, and Trade openness
average). This pure cross-sectional data set then consists of 94 entries, i.e., 94 countries.
The question we are asking in this extension is whether the probability of military inter-
vention by the UN in a conflict country is affected by intervention decisions in neighboring
countries.1 We run a classic non-spatial Probit model and assess the presence of spatial error
autocorrelation, with the results displayed in Table A.4. If we found such evidence, then spa-
tial Probit models should be preferred over our logit estimations because ignoring spatial error
autocorrelation in the error term would result in inefficiency and inconsistency of the maximum
likelihood estimator (Amaral et al., 2012). The literature on tests for spatial error autocorre-
lation exhibits three main versions after Pinkse and Slade (1998), Kelejian and Prucha (2001),
and Pinkse (2004). However, these tests exhibit crucial differences regarding the sample size.
Amaral et al. (2012) show that the generalized Moran’s I statistic (MI) devised by Kelejian
and Prucha (2001) achieves its asymptotic distribution in sample sizes as small as N=49 and is
not affected by spatial correlation in the regressors. The other two statistics require large sam-
ple sizes, in the order of thousands, to achieve their asymptotic distributions and are slightly
1By neighbors, we mean countries that share a common border with the conflict nation.
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affected by spatial correlation in the regressors.2 Thus, we opt for the generalized Moran’s I
statistic (MI).
Specifically, we use the module spreg.probit in the PySAL library (Rey and Anselin, 2010) to
run the classic non-spatial Probit and the MI test using the spatial version of our data described
above. In these estimations, displayed in Table A.4, the distance findings from Table 1 receive
strong support, both in terms of significance and magnitudes, which are in fact even larger for
the Western permanent members. As before, conflict intensity matters, whereas conflict form
remains an insignificant predictor. Also, the previous conclusions for the remaining variables are
generally confirmed. Finally, the MI test results then show no clear evidence for the presence
of spatial error autocorrelation.3 Thus, the probability of military intervention by the UN does
not appear to depend on previous interventions in neighboring countries.
2 Military Opposition, Year of Conflict, and Other Interven-
tions
In additional specifications, displayed in Table A.5, we also consider three additional tests for
the importance of practical considerations in UNSC decisions. First, we include the Composite
Index of National Capability score from the Correlates of War data set (version 4.0 built on
Singer et al., 1972, and Singer, 1988). The military strengths and capabilities of the conflict
country may well influence the chances of success for a potential UN intervention. Thus, it
is important to test whether military strength is an important intervention determinant in
itself, but also whether the National Capability Score can explain the distance finding. Indeed,
military strength proves to affect the chances of intervention negatively, although this finding is
not statistically significant on conventional levels. Beyond that, the coefficient on Distance to
West remains virtually unchanged.
Second, we add a basic time trend in our main estimation, incorporating the beginning
year of the conflict. As both weapons’ and information technology advanced rapidly over the
past decades, a potential intervention today could be cheaper and easier to plan, but it may
2See Amaral et al. (2012) for a complete description.
3A significant p-value for the MI test indicates that the residuals of the regression are spatially autocorrelated,
but the test does not discriminate between the error or lag dependence.
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also be easier to foresee the chances of success. However, any trend parameters remain firmly
insignificant throughout our estimations. Similarly, including a squared time trend does not
appear to matter.
Finally, considerations regarding costs and success probabilities may be reflected in both
the number of ongoing interventions by the UN at the beginning of the conflict and whether
the conflict country has been subject to a previous military intervention. With more military
commitments already in progress, budget constraints may become more important, therefore
lowering the chances of starting a new operation. Interestingly, the number of current interven-
tions appears to have a positive effect on intervention decisions.
In terms of success probability, a previous intervention may be helpful for knowing the
country and the specific conflict at stake. In addition, previously installed facilities or local
contacts from the previous operations could be employed. However, whether the conflict country
received a UNSC intervention previously has no statistically significant impact. In addition, the
importance of Distance to West remains once again robust to these extensions.
3 Relationship to the UN, Conflict Duration, and Religious Ori-
entation
In additional estimations, we test for other attributes of the conflict countries. First, we include
a binary variable for conflict countries that were members of the UN at the inception of the
conflict (variable UN member). We then add a dummy variable for conflict countries that
formed part of the UNSC as a non-permanent member at any time during the conflict (UNSC
member). Both of these variables reflect the basic relationship between the conflict country and
the UN and may therefore enter the decision-making process of the council. Interestingly, the
probability of intervention is reduced by over 15 percentage points if a conflict country was a
member of the UNSC at any time during the conflict. However, this finding does not explain
the importance of geographical distance.
Further, we incorporate the total duration of the conflict in months (see Gilligan et al.,
2003, and Fortna, 2004). Even though this estimation may raise endogeneity issues in the
form of reverse causality (not only could the conflict duration affect the probability of UN
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intervention, but a UN intervention could also affect the conflict duration), the conflict duration
does not appear to matter. Finally, Table A.5 also displays results turning to the religious
composition of the conflict country. We use the fractions of Catholic, Muslim, and Protestant
citizens in society, as measured in 1980, to see whether religion is associated with the intervention
probability. However, the results reject this idea and once again leave the coefficient associated
with Distance to West virtually unchanged.
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Table A.1: Conflicts since 1945. Interv stands for UN military intervention.
Country Year Interv Country Year Interv Country Year Interv
Africa
Egypt 1951 yes Tanzania 1978 Centra Afr. Rep. 2001 yes
Egypt 1956 yes South Africa 1978 Cote d’Ivoire 2002 yes
Cameroon 1960 Tunisia 1980 Nigeria 2003
Ethiopia 1960 Liberia 1980 yes Nigeria 2004
Congo (DR) 1960 Gambia 1981 Djibouti 2008
Congo (DR) 1960 yes Egypt 1981 Mauritania 2008
Ethiopia 1961 yes Kenya 1982 Libya (NA) 2011 yes
Algeria 1963 Somalia 1982 yes (Sudan) 2011 yes
Sudan (NA) 1963 Ethiopia 1982 (Sudan) 2011
Congo (DR) 1964 yes Chad 1983 South Sudan (NA) 2012 yes
Ethiopia 1964 Burkina Faso 1985 South Sudan (NA) 2012
Gabon 1964 Togo 1986 Mali (NA) 2012
Ethiopia 1964 Burkina Faso 1987
Burundi 1965 yes Chad 1987 Asia
Ghana 1966 Senegal 1988 China (NA) 1950
Chad 1966 yes Comoros 1989 Indonesia (NA) 1950
Zimbabwe 1966 Rwanda 1990 yes Thailand 1951
South Africa 1966 yes Mali 1990 Indonesia (NA) 1953
Nigeria 1966 Algeria 1990 India 1955
Egypt 1967 yes Sierra Leone 1991 yes Vietnam (NA) 1955
Nigeria 1967 Djibouti 1991 Oman (NA) 1957
Cambodia (NA) 1967 yes Angola 1991 yes Malaysia 1957
Sudan 1971 yes Ethiopia 1991 Myanmar (NA) 1957
Morocco 1971 Niger 1991 Iraq (NA) 1958 yes
Madagascar 1971 Congo, Rep. 1993 Lebanon (NA) 1958 yes
Uganda 1971 Eritrea 1993 China 1959
Ethiopia 1974 Niger 1994 Myanmar (NA) 1959
Cambodia 1975 Cameroon 1994 Lao PDR (NA) 1959
Morocco 1975 yes Niger 1995 Nepal 1960 yes
Angola 1975 yes Comoros 1997 Iraq (NA) 1961
Cambodia 1975 Lesotho 1998 Indonesia 1962
Ethiopia 1975 Guinea-Bissau 1998 yes Indonesia 1962 yes
Mauritania 1975 Eritrea 1998 yes Malaysia 1963
Ethiopia 1977 Congo (DR) 1998 yes Thailand 1965
Mozambique 1977 yes Guinea 2000 Vietnam (NA) 1965
Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), using conflicts since 1950.
Exculding extrasystemic armed conflicts.
NA = data not available and conflict not included in sample.
Conflicts in parentheses use data from the World Bank for GDP/capita and Trade openness.
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Table A.1 cont.: Conflicts since 1945. Interv stands for UN military intervention.
Country Year Interv Country Year Interv Country Year Interv
Asia Pakistan 1990 Bosnia & Herz. 1993
Indonesia 1965 Iraq 1990 yes (Azerbaijan) 1993
India 1966 Russia 1990 Serbia 1996 yes
Syria 1966 (Tajikistan) 1992 yes Macedonia, FYR 2000
Israel 1967 (Tajikistan) 1992
Israel 1967 yes India 1993 North America
Oman (NA) 1968 Russia 1993 Cuba (NA) 1953
China 1969 Yemen, Rep. 1994 Honduras 1957
China 1969 Russia 1994 Dominican Rep. 1965 yes
Philippines 1970 Myanmar (NA) 1997 El Salvador 1969
Pakistan 1971 Russia 1999 El Salvador 1972 yes
Sri Lanka 1971 Uzbekistan 1999 Nicaragua 1974 yes
Iran 1972 Iraq 2003 Grenada 1983
Iran 1972 India 2004 Panama 1989
Myanmar (NA) 1973 India 2005 Panama 1989
Pakistan 1973 Russia 2007 Haiti 1989 yes
China 1974 Myanmar (NA) 2009 Trinidad & Tobago 1990
Indonesia 1975 yes Mexico 1994
Bangladesh 1975 Europe United States 2001
Sri Lanka 1975 Hungary (NA) 1956
Afghanistan 1978 yes France 1961 South America
Saudi Arabia (NA) 1979 France 1961 Argentina 1955
India 1979 Spain 1968 Venezuela 1962
Iran 1979 United Kingdom 1970 Colombia 1964
Afghanistan 1979 Cyprus 1974 Peru 1965
India 1979 Romania 1989 El Salvador 1969
India 1981 (Georgia) 1991 Uruguay 1970
Lao PDR 1982 Serbia 1991 yes El Salvador 1972 yes
India 1983 (Georgia) 1991 Chile 1973
Turkey 1983 Azerbaijan 1991 Nicaragua 1974 yes
India 1984 (Moldova) 1991 Argentina 1982
Israel 1986 Serbia 1991 Suriname 1986
Turkey 1987 (Georgia) 1992 yes Ecuador 1995
Indonesia 1989 Bosnia & Herz. 1992
India 1989 Croatia 1992 yes Oceania
Russia 1990 Bosnia & Herz. 1992 yes Papua New G. 1989
Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), using conflicts since 1950.
Exculding extrasystemic armed conflicts.
NA = data not available and conflict not included in sample.
Conflicts in parentheses use data from the World Bank for GDP/capita and Trade openness.
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Table A.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N Source1 Description
Interv 0.23 (0.42) 174 UN Dummy = 1 if UN military intervention takes place (peacekeeping
or peacebuilding)
Distance to China 5.64 (4.47) 174 Distance to China in 1,000 km
Distance to France 4.62 (2.78) 174 Distance to France in 1,000 km
Distance to Russia 3.36 (2.98) 174 Distance to Russia in 1,000 km
Distance to UK 5.18 (2.67) 174 Distance to the United Kingdom in 1,000 km
Distance to US 7.85 (3.03) 174 Distance to the United States in 1,000 km
Distance to West 3.95 (2.58) 174 Distance to the closest border of France, the UK, or the US in 1,000
km
Distance to East 3.07 (3.08) 174 Distance to the closest border of China or Russia in 1,000 km
Intense 0.45 (0.50) 174 UCDP Dummy = 1 if over 999 battle-related deaths
Internal 0.59 (0.49) 174 UCDP Dummy = 1 if internal armed conflict
Interstate 0.20 (0.40) 174 UCDP Dummy = 1 if interstate armed conflict
internationalized 0.21 (0.41) 174 UCDP Dummy = 1 if internationalized internal armed conflict
Population 9.69 (1.82) 174 PWT 7.1 Ln(population); variable POP
GDP/capita 7.48 (1.06) 174 PWT 7.1 Ln[PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Laspeyres) at 2005 constant
prices]; variable rgdpl
Trade openness 3.67 (0.79) 174 PWT 7.1 Ln(openness at 2005 constant prices in %); variable openk
Africa 0.44 (0.50) 174 Dummy = 1 if country in Africa
Asia 0.32 (0.47) 174 Dummy = 1 if country in Asia
Europe 0.11 (0.32) 174 Dummy = 1 if country in Europe
northamerica 0.07 (0.25) 174 Dummy = 1 if country in North America
oceania 0.01 (0.08) 174 Dummy = 1 if country in Oceania
southamerica 0.05 (0.22) 174 Dummy = 1 if country in Latin America
french 0.29 (0.46) 174 Dummy = 1 if (former) French colony
portuguese 0.04 (0.20) 174 Dummy = 1 if (former) Portuguese colony
dutch 0.08 (0.27) 174 Dummy = 1 if (former) Dutch colony
Cold War 0.76 (0.43) 174 Dummy = 1 if the conflict started before 1992
Own Interv 0.07 (0.26) 174 Dummy = 1 if one of the 5 permanent UNSC members intervened
independently in conflict
Polity IV -0.87 (6.35) 164 Polity IV Level of democracy from -10 (totally autocratic) to +10 (total
democracy); variable polity2 at beginning year of conflict
Affchina 0.89 (0.11) 112 Affinity of Nations Voting similarity index in UN resolutions between conflict nation
and China (beginning year of conflict)
Afffrance 0.61 (0.11) 150 Affinity of Nations Voting similarity index in UN resolutions between conflict nation
and France (beginning year of conflict)
Affrussia 0.77 (0.14) 131 Affinity of Nations Voting similarity index in UN resolutions between conflict nation
and Russia (beginning year of conflict)
Affuk 0.59 (0.12) 150 Affinity of Nations Voting similarity index in UN resolutions between conflict nation
and the UK (beginning year of conflict)
1UN = UN Security Council resolutions; UCDP = Uppsala Conflict Data Program;
PWT = Penn World Table version 7.1.
8
Table A.2 cont.: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N Source1 Description
Affus 0.44 (0.20) 149 Affinity of Nations Voting similarity index in UN resolutions between conflict na-
tion and the US (beginning year of conflict)
Affwest 0.63 (0.10) 150 Affinity of Nations Voting similarity index in UN resolutions between conflict na-
tion and the maximum score from France, the UK, or the US
(beginning year of conflict)
Affeast 0.84 (0.15) 144 Affinity of Nations Voting similarity index in UN resolutions between conflict na-
tion and the maximum score from China or Russia (beginning
year of conflict)
Exports to US 0.83 (2.59) 158 Correlates of War Ln(total exports of conflict country to the US at beginning
year of conflict)
Imports from US 0.96 (2.23) 158 Correlates of War Ln(total imports of conflict country from the US at beginning
year of conflict)
Exports to West 1.80 (2.23) 154 Correlates of War Ln(total exports of conflict country to France, the UK, and
the US at beginning year of conflict)
Imports from West 1.91 (1.84) 154 Correlates of War Ln(total imports of conflict country from France, the UK, and
the US at beginning year of conflict)
Total aid 18.13 (1.93) 145 World Bank Ln(total aid received by conflict country at beginning year of
conflict)
Aid from US 16.83 (1.73) 118 World Bank Ln(total aid received by conflict country from the US at be-
ginning year of conflict)
Distance to Saudi Arabia 3.32 (3.37) 174 Distance to Saudi Arabia in 1,000 km
Distance to Iraw 3.83 (3.38) 174 Distance to Iraq in 1,000 km
Distance to Iran 3.68 (3.50) 174 Distance to Iran in 1,000 km
Distance to Kuwait 4.22 (3.47) 174 Distance to Kuwait in 1,000 km
Distance to V enezuela 9.01 (4.25) 174 Distance to Venezuela in 1,000 km
Distance to Israel 3.98 (3.31) 174 Distance to Israel in 1,000 km
National Capability Score 0.01 (0.03) 166 Correlates of War Composite Index of National Capability score
Y ear 1980.66 (14.08) 174 UCDP Beginning year of conflict
Current Intervs 6.51 (5.64) 174 UN Amount of ongoing military UN interventions at the beginning
year of the conflict
Previous Interv 0.07 (0.25) 174 UN Dummy = 1 if UN intervened in country before
UN member 0.95 (0.22) 174 UN Dummy = 1 if conflict country is UN member in the beginning
year of the conflict
UNSC member 0.28 (0.45) 174 UN Dummy = 1 if conflict country was a non-permanent member
of the UNSC at any time during the conflict
Duration 143.02 (170.26) 174 UCDP Duration of conflict in months (until December 2012)
Catholic 23.58 (32.83) 131 QoG Percentage catholic in society in 1980
Muslim 32.59 (36.73) 131 QoG Percentage muslim in society in 1980
Protestant 6.23 (10.77) 131 QoG Percentage protestant in society in 1980
1UCDP = Uppsala Conflict Data Program; QoG = Quality of Governance index from Teorell et al. (2011).
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Table A.4: Classic non-spatial Probit and spatial diagnostics. Dependent variable is probability
to intervene (Intervspatial), replicating Table 1. Displaying marginal effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance to China -0.006
(0.017)
Distance to France -0.062∗∗
(0.028)
Distance to Russia -0.046
(0.032)
Distance to UK -0.062∗∗
(0.028)
Distance to US -0.049∗∗
(0.025)
Distance to West -0.073∗∗
(0.032)
Distance to East -0.005
(0.042)
Maximum intense 0.296∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗
(0.103) (0.098) (0.101) (0.098) (0.099) (0.097)
# of internal 0.019 0.018 0.014 0.018 0.021 0.02
(0.041) (0.041) (0.04) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
# of interstate 0.059 0.045 0.038 0.045 0.043 0.04
(0.06) (0.059) (0.06) (0.059) (0.058) (0.06)
Population average -0.059 -0.063 -0.062 -0.064 -0.078∗ -0.07∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.039) (0.04) (0.041) (0.04)
GDP/capita average -0.114∗ -0.176∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.064) (0.058) (0.063) (0.061) (0.061)
Trade openness average -0.004 -0.015 -0.008 -0.015 -0.026 -0.033
(0.068) (0.07) (0.068) (0.069) (0.068) (0.07)
Africa -0.049 -0.31 -0.231 -0.253 0.249 0.035
(0.169) (0.197) (0.204) (0.179) (0.202) (0.267)
Asia -0.234 -0.368∗ -0.501∗ -0.334∗ 0.175 -0.026
(0.253) (0.191) (0.285) (0.182) (0.236) (0.422)
Europe 0.02 -0.321 -0.297 -0.287 0.287 -0.024
-0.227 (0.23) (0.298) (0.218) (0.191) (0.379)
Colony fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 94 94 94 94 94 94
Diagnostic for spatial dependence
Kelejian-Prucha MI test 1.835∗ 1.193 1.584 1.246 1.798∗ 1.193
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Additional robustness checks from logit regressions, displaying marginal effects.
Dependent variable is probability of military intervention by the UN (Interv).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: anyInterv
Distance to West -0.041∗∗ -0.038∗∗ -0.036∗∗ -0.040∗∗ -0.036∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.042∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Distance to East 0.004 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010
(0.029) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.033)
National Capability Score -5.167
(3.502)
Y ear 0.002
(0.003)
Current Intervs 0.008∗
(0.005)
Previous Intervs 0.083
(0.087)
UN member 0.008
(0.152)
UNSC member -0.151∗∗
(0.068)
Duration -0.000
(0.000)
Catholic 0.189
(0.138)
Muslim -0.077
(0.129)
Protestant 0.114
(0.414)
Control variablesa yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Colony fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 166 174 174 174 174 174 131
Log lik. -62.78 -68.74 -67.50 -69.11 -66.95 -68.99 -46.22
Chi-squared 56.86 43.10 44.32 44.28 39.17 43.78 34.79
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
aIncorporates Intense, Internal, Interstate, Population, GDP/capita , Trade openness,
Africa, Asia, and Europe.
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